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Abstract
Quantum key distribution, first proposed by Bennett
and Brassard, provides a possible key distribution scheme
whose security depends only on the quantum laws of
physics. So far the protocol has been proved secure even
under channel noise and detector faults of the receiver, but
is vulnerable if the photon source used is imperfect. In this
paper we propose and give a concrete design for a new con-
cept, self-checking source, which requires the manufacturer
of the photon source to provide certain tests; these tests are
designed such that, if passed, the source is guaranteed to
be adequate for the security of the quantum key distribution
protocol, even though the testing devices may not be built
to the original specification. The main mathematical re-
sult is a structural theorem which states that, for any state
in a Hilbert space, if certain EPR-type equations are sat-
isfied, the state must be essentially the orthogonal sum of
EPR pairs.
1 Introduction
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard [7] proposed a rev-
olutionary concept that key distribution may be accom-
plished through public communications in quantum chan-
nels. Hopefully, the privacy of the resulted key is to be
guaranteed by quantum physical laws alone, quite indepen-
dent of how much computational resource is available to the
adversary. The primary quantum phase of the proposed pro-
tocol is a sequence of single photons produced by Alice (the
sender) and detected by Bob (the receiver).
The security proof of the BB84-protocol (or its many
variants) for adversaries with unrestricted power is a dif-
ficult mathematical problem, and has only been achieved
with any generality in the last few years. In brief, the BB84-
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protocol is secure even with channel noise and possible de-
tector faults for Bob, provided that the apparatus used by
Alice to produce the photons is perfect. The purpose of
this paper is to remove this last assumption, by propos-
ing and giving a concrete design for a new concept, self-
checking source, which requires the manufacturer of the
photon source to provide certain tests; these tests are de-
signed such that, if passed, the source is guaranteed to be
adequate for the security of the BB84-protocol, even though
the testing devices may not be built to the original specifi-
cation. A self-checking source must receive inputs from
multiple locations (two in our case) and returns classical
outcomes at these locations. The test needs only to consider
the classical inputs and the classical outcomes.
It is well known that there are clever ways to construct
imperfect sources for the coding used in the BB84-protocol
that behave quite normal on the surface, but seriously com-
promise the security. In other words, the BB84 coding to-
gether with the standard test executed in the BB84-protcol
are problematic because the external data can be reproduced
by quantum apparatus which are not secure at all. We pro-
pose a different source that is self-checking and yet can be
used to generate the BB84 coding. Our result means that
one does not have to perform an infinite number of ways
to check all possible devious constructions. In some ways
our test can be regarded as simple self-testing quantum pro-
grams. Our result requires that, when the inputs to the
source are fixed, the distribution of probability for the clas-
sical outcomes is also fixed.
Our result is that, if these distributions of probability (as-
sociated with the different inputs) are exactly as in the spec-
ification for our self-checking source, the state transmitted
is a direct sum of states that are individually normally emit-
ted by a perfect source. In practice, we cannot expect these
probabilities to be exactly as in the specification for the self-
checking source. However, one can test that they are not too
far away from this specification. Furthermore, one should
expect that the closer to their specified values these proba-
bilities will be, the closer to the direct sum described above
the source will be. This is usually sufficient to prove secu-
rity.
In Section 2, we show how the main mathematical ques-
tion arises from the security requirement from the BB84-
protocol. In Section 3, the precise question is formulated,
and the main theorem stated. The proof of the main theorem
is given in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
Ideally, the objective of key distribution is to allow two
participants, typically called Alice and Bob, who initially
share no information, to share a secret random key (a string
of bits) at the end. A third party, usually called Eve, should
not be able to obtain any information about the key. In real-
ity, this ideal objective cannot be realized, especially if we
give unlimited power to the cheater, but a quantum protocol
can achieve something close to it. See [8] (and more re-
cently [28]) for a detailed specification of the quantum key
distribution task. One of the greatest challenges in quan-
tum cryptography is to prove that a quantum protocol ac-
complishes the specified task. One can experimentally try
different kinds of attacks, but one can never know in which
way the quantum apparatus can be defective. In any case,
such experiments are almost never done in practice because
it is not the way to establish the security of quantum key dis-
tribution. The correct way is a properly designed protocol
together with a security proof.
Recently, there has been a growing interest in practi-
cal quantum cryptography and systems have been imple-
mented [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. However, proving the secu-
rity of quantum key distribution against all attacks turned
out to be a serious challenge. During many years, many
researchers directly or indirectly worked on this problem
[7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Using novel
techniques [20, 21], a proof of security against all attacks
for the quantum key distribution protocol of Bennett and
Brassard was obtained in 1996 [22]. Related results were
subsequently obtained [23, 24, 25, 26], but as yet [22] is the
only known proof of security against all attacks. A more
recent version of the proof with extension to the result is
proposed in [28]. Also, the basic ideas of [9, 10, 17] might
lead to a complete solution if we accept fault tolerant com-
putation (for example, see [27]), but this is not possible with
current technology.
In the quantum transmission, Alice sends n photons to
Bob prepared individually in one of the four BB84 states
uniformly picked at random. The BB84 states denoted
b(0, 2), b(1, 2), b(0, 3) and b(1, 3) correspond to a photon
polarized at 0, 90, 45 and−45 degrees respectively (see fig-
ure 1). (We reserve the states b(0, 1) and b(1, 1) for further
use: we will have to add two other states in our analysis.)
Bob measures each photon using either the rectilinear ba-
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Figure 1. The BB84 states
sis {b(0, 2), b(1, 2)} or the diagonal basis {b(0, 3), b(1, 3)}
uniformly chosen at random.
The basic idea of the protocol is the following. Both, Eve
and Bob, do not know Alice’s bases until after the quantum
transmission. Eve cannot obtain information without creat-
ing a disturbance which can be detected. Bob also disturbs
the state when he uses the wrong basis, but this is not a
problem. After the quantum transmission, Alice and Bob
announce their bases. Alice and Bob share a bit when their
bases are identical, so they know which bits they share. The
key point is that it’s too late for Eve because the photons are
on Bob’s side. However, the security of the protocol relies
on the fact that the source behaves as specified, and this is
the main subject of this paper.
Informally, the source used in the original BB84-
protocol [7] can be described as a blackbox with two but-
tons on it: base2-button and base3-button. When Alice
pushes the base2-button, the output is either (0, b(0, 2)) or
(1, b(1, 2)), where b(0, 2) and b(1, 2) form an orthonormal
basis of a two-dimensional system HB , with each possi-
bility occurring with probability 1/2. After the baseα-
button is pushed, of the output (x, b(x, α)), only the vector
b(x, α) goes out to Bob; bit x is only visible to Alice. Sim-
ilarly, if Alice pushes the base3-button, the output is either
(0, b(0, 3)) or (1, b(1, 3)), with each possibility occurring
with probability 1/2, where
b(0, 3) = (b(0, 2) + b(1, 2))/
√
2,
b(1, 3) = (−b(0, 2) + b(1, 2))/
√
2. (1)
The suggested way in [7, 8] to achieve the above is to
have the blackbox generates a fixed state, say b(0, 2), then
the bit x ∈ {0, 1} is uniformly chosen at random and this
state is rotated of an appropriate angle to create the desired
state b(x, α) (assuming that the baseα-button is pressed).
The security proof of the protocol extends to sources be-
yond mentioned above. To obtain our self-testing source,
we need to consider a different type of sources. A con-
jugate coding source S = (HA ⊗ HB,Ψ,M2,M3) con-
sists of a pure state Ψ in a Hilbert space HA ⊗ HB , and
two measurements (each binary-valued)M2, M3 defined on
HA⊗HB but operating only on coordinates in HA. Pushing
base2-button, base3-button performs respectively measure-
ment M2, M3. (We have restricted the form of the initial
state to be a pure state |Ψ〉 instead of a general mixed state.
This is without loss of generality for our result, as we will
see.)
Let P+α , P−α , where α ∈ {2, 3}, denote the projection
operators to the subspaces corresponding to the outcomes
0, 1 for measurement Mα. (We sometimes use the notation
P±α to denote the measurement Mα itself.) After perform-
ing the measurement, only the coordinates in HB are made
available for transmission. Thus, if button α is pushed with
outcome 0, the density operator in the transmitted beam is
trA(P
+
α |Ψ〉〈Ψ|P+α ). For convenience, we sometimes iden-
tify + with 0, and − with 1. Thus, if button α is pushed
with outcome x, the density operator is trA(P xα |Ψ〉〈Ψ|P xα ).
The security proof of the protocol is valid if the source
satisfies, for x ∈ {0, 1}, the conditions
trA(P
x
2 |Ψ〉〈Ψ|P x2 ) = |b(x, 2)〉〈b(x, 2)|/2,
trA(P
x
3 |Ψ〉〈Ψ|P x3 ) = |b(x, 3)〉〈b(x, 3)|/2, (2)
where (b(0, 2), b(1, 2)) and (b(0, 3), b(1, 3)) are orthonor-
mal bases that satisfy equation (1).
It is well known (and easy to see) that the fol-
lowing source satisfies the above condition. Let HA,
HB each be a two-dimensional Hilbert space. Let
(a(0, 2), a(1, 2)), (a(0, 3), a(1, 3)) be two pairs of or-
thonormal bases of HA related by equation (1); similarly
let (b(0, 2), b(1, 2)), (b(0, 3), b(1, 3)) be two pairs of or-
thonormal bases related by equation (1) for HB . Let Ψ be
the Bell state (|a(0, 2)〉|b(0, 2)〉+ |a(1, 2)〉|b(1, 2)〉)/√2 =
(|a(0, 3)〉|b(0, 3)〉+|a(1, 3)〉|b(1, 3)〉)/√2. LetM2,M3 be
two measurements onHA⊗HB that operate only on the co-
ordinates in HA. The measurement M2 consists of the two
orthogonal subspaces |a(0, 2)〉 ⊗HB , |a(1, 2)〉 ⊗HB . The
measurement M3 consists of the two orthogonal subspaces
|a(0, 3)〉 ⊗HB , |a(1, 3)〉 ⊗HB . If we restrict them to HA
only, the measurementM2, M3 are the measurements in the
bases (a(0, 2), a(1, 2)) and (a(0, 3), a(1, 3)) respectively.
Clearly, (2) is true. We call this source the perfect system.
More generally, the security proof extends to systems
that behave like a mixture of orthogonal ideal systems. A
source is an extended perfect system if there exist in HB
orthogonal two dimensional subspaces Hi (i ∈ I , some in-
dex set), with bi(x, 2), bi(x, 3) denoting states in Hi that
respect the same ortogonality condition as the above states
b(x, 2), b(x, 3) in HB and equation (1), such that for some
probability distribution pi on i ∈ I ,
trA(P
x
2 |Ψ〉〈Ψ|P x2 ) =
∑
i∈I
pi |bi(x, 2)〉〈bi(x, 2)|/2,
trA(P
x
3 |Ψ〉〈Ψ|P x3 ) =
∑
i∈I
pi |bi(x, 2)〉〈bi(x, 3)|/2.(3)
Now comes the question. If a manufacturer hands over
a source and claims that it is a perfect system, how can we
check this claims, or at least, makes sure that it is an ex-
tended perfect system?
If the source is a perfect system, let N2, N3 be the mea-
surements operating on HB in exactly the same way as
M2,M3 on HA. That is, let R+α , R−α (where α ∈ {2, 3})
be the projection operators to subspaces by Nα with out-
come 0, 1; R+2 , R
−
2 project to HA⊗|b(0, 2)〉, HA⊗|b1,2(〉),
and R+3 , R
−
3 project to HA ⊗ |b(0, 3)〉, HA ⊗ |b(1, 3)〉,
respectively. Now observe that the following are true for
α 6= β ∈ {2, 3}, x, y ∈ {+,−},
||P xα |Ψ〉||2 = 1/2,
||RyαP xα |Ψ〉||2
||P xα |Ψ〉||2
= δx,y,
||RyβP xα |Ψ〉||2
||P xα |Ψ〉||2
= 1/2. (4)
We can ask the manufacturer to provide in addition two
measuring devices outside the blackbox corresponding to
N2, N3. A test can be executed to verify that these equa-
tions are satisfied (see the related discussion in the Intro-
duction). Furthermore, as a matter of physical implemen-
tation, to make sure that M ′s and N ′s operate on HA, HB
respectively, we can further demand that the buttons are re-
placed by two measuring devices outside the blackbox. Is
that sufficient to guarantee that we have at least an extended
perfect system?
Unfortunately, the answer is NO. It is not hard to con-
struct examples where (4) is satisfied, but it is not an ex-
tended ideal system (and in fact, security is gravely com-
promised).
However, as we will see, if we add one more measure-
ment appropriately on each side, and perform the corre-
sponding checks, then it gurantees to be an extended perfect
system. That will be the main result of this paper.
3 Main Theorem
An
object S = (HA ⊗ HB, |Ψ〉, P±1 , P±2 , P±3 , R±1 , R±2 , R±3 )
is called an ideal source if the following are valid:
each of HA, HB is a 2-dimensional Hilbert space with
(a(0, 2), a(1, 2)), (a(0, 3), a(1, 3)) being a pair of or-
thonormal basis of HA satisfing equation (1), and
(b(0, 2), b(1, 2)), (b(0, 3), b(1, 3)) being a pair of orthonor-
mal basis of HB satisfying equation (1); Ψ is the Bell
state (a(0, α)b(0, α)+a(1, α)b(1, α))/
√
2; P+2 , P
−
2 are the
projection operators on the states a(0, 2), a(1, 2) respec-
tively; P+3 , P
−
3 are the projection operators on the states
a(0, 3), a(1, 3) respectively. To describe P±1 , let a(x,
(x ∈ {0, 1}) be the state a(x, 2) + a(x, 3) after being nor-
malized to unit length. The states a(x, 1) and b(x, 1) have
a particular status in our proof, and we alternatively de-
note a(x, 1) = |x〉 and b(x, 1) = |x〉′. Then P+1 , P−1
are respectively the projection operators on the states |0〉,
|1〉. As usual, we consider P xα and P xα ⊗ I as two alterna-
tive notations for one and the same projection operators on
HA ⊗ HB . Clearly, P±1 , P±2 , P±3 are the projection oper-
ators on HA ⊗ HB corresponding to measuring HA with
respect to three bases of HA (the bases for P±2 , P±3 at an
angle of −pi/8, +pi/8 with repect to the basis for P±1 ).
The projection operators R±1 , R±2 , R±3 operate on coor-
dinates in HB , and are similarly defined as the P ′s. Let
pα,β(x, y) = ||RxαP yβ |Ψ〉||2. (5)
These numbers can be easily computed. For exam-
ple, p1,2(0, 0) = (cos(pi/8))2/2 and p1,2(0, 1) =
(sin(pi/8))2/2.
A self-checking source
S = (HA ⊗HB, |Ψ〉, P±1 , P±2 , P±3 , R±1 , R±2 , R±3 ) consists
of an initial state |Ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB , three measurements
P±1 , P
±
2 , P
±
3 acting on coordinates in HA, and three mea-
surements R±1 , R
±
2 , R
±
3 acting on coordinates in HB , such
that the following conditions are satisfied:
||RxαP yβ |Ψ〉||2 = pα,β(x, y). (6)
We will see that a self-checking source gives rise to an
extended ideal system.
An extended ideal source
S = (HA ⊗HB, |Ψ〉, P±1 , P±2 , P±3 , R±1 , R±2 , R±3 ) is an or-
thogonal sum of ideal sources in a similar sense as an ex-
tended perfect system in relation to perfect systems. That
is, if there is an index set I , orthogonal two dimensional
subspaces Ki ⊆ HA with ai(x) (or alternatively ai(x, 1))
denoting the state |x〉 in Ki, orthogonal two dimensional
subspacesHi ⊆ HB with bi(x, α) (or alternatively bi(x, 1))
denoting the state |x〉′ in Hi, such that for some (possibly
complex) numbers αi on i ∈ I with
∑
i∈I |α|2 = 1,
Ψ =
∑
i∈I
αi (ai(0)⊗ bi(0) + ai(1)⊗ bi(1)).
Furthermore, for each i, for every projection P ∈
{P±1 , P±2 , P±3 }, P acts exactly on Ki like the correspond-
ing projection on HA in the ideal source case. That is,
if P |x〉 = λ0|0〉 + λ1|1〉 in the ideal case, we have that
Pai(x) = λ0ai(0) + λ1ai(1). The following fact is easy to
verify.
Fact 1 Any extended ideal source is a self-checking
source.
Also, it is clear that from any self-checking source, by
omitting the measurements P±1 , R
±
1 , one obtains a conju-
gate coding source.
Fact 2 The conjugate coding source obtained from an ex-
tended ideal source must be an extended perfect system.
The converse of fact 1 is our main theorem.
Main Theorem Any self-checking source is an extended
ideal source.
It follows from the Main Theorem and Fact 2 that a self-
checking source provides an adequate source for the BB84
quantum key distribution protocol [7, 8].
We remark that in our definition of self-checking source,
the restriction of the initial state to a pure state |Ψ〉 instead
of a mixed state ρ is not a real restriction. Given a source
with a mixed state ρ satisfying equation (6), we can con-
struct one with a pure state |Ψ〉 (by enlarging appropriately
HA) satisfying (6). We can apply the Main Theorem to this
new source, and conclude that it also gives rise to an ade-
quate source for the BB84-protocol.
It is well known, from discussions about EPR Experi-
ments (see e.g. [29]), that quantities such as ||RxαP yβ |Ψ〉||2
exhibit behavior characteristic of quantum systems that can-
not be explained by classical theories. One may view our
main result as stating that such constraints are sometimes
strong enough to yield precise structural information about
the given quantum system; in this case it has to be an or-
thogonal sum of EPR pairs
4 Proof of Main Theorem
We give in this Section a sketch of the main steps in the
proof.
Let S = (HA ⊗HB, |Ψ〉, P±1 , P±2 , P±3 , R±1 , R±2 , R±3 ) be a
self-checking source. We show that it must be an extended
ideal source.
In Section 4.1, we derive some structural properties of
the projection operators as imposed by the self-checking
conditions, but without considering in details the constraints
due to the tensor product nature of the state space. In Sec-
tions 4.2 and 4.3, the state is decomposed explicitly in terms
of tensor products, and the properties derived in Section 4.1
are used to show that this decomposition satisfies the con-
ditions stated in the Main Theorem.
4.1 Properties of Projections
In this subsection, we present some properties of the pro-
jected states (such as P+1 Ψ, P+1 R−2 Ψ) as consequences of
the constraints put on self-checking sources. The proofs of
these lemmas are somewhat lengthy, and will be left to the
complete paper.
Lemma 1 For every α ∈ {1, 2, 3} and x ∈ {+,−}, we
have P xαΨ = RxαΨ.
Let vi ∈ V,wi ∈W for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, where V,W are two
Hilbert spaces. We say that (v1, v2, · · · , vm) is isormorphic
to (w1, w2, · · · , wm) if there is an inner-product-preserving
linear mapping f : V → W such that wi = f(vi) for all i.
Let θ = pi/8, and u1, u2, · · · , u5 be elements of C2 de-
fined by
u1 = (1, 0),
u2 = (cos
2 θ, sin θ cos θ),
u3 = (sin
2 θ,− sin θ cos θ),
u4 = (cos
2 θ,− sin θ cos θ),
u5 = (sin
2 θ, sin θ cos θ).
Lemma 2 (u1, u2, · · · , u5) is isomorphic to√
2(P+1 Ψ, P
+
1 R
+
3 Ψ, P
+
1 R
−
3 Ψ, P
+
1 R
+
2 Ψ, P
+
1 R
−
2 Ψ).
Lemma 3 Let h = P+1 R+3 Ψ− P+1 R+2 Ψ. Then R−1 h = h.
Lemma 4 Let k = P+2 P
+
1 Ψ− (cos θ)2P+1 Ψ. Then (R+2 −
R+3 )k = 2(sin θ cos θ)
2P−1 Ψ.
Since there is a symmetry between the projection opera-
tors P and R, the following is clearly true.
Lemma 5 Lemmas 2-4 remain valid if the projection oper-
ators P and R are exchanged.
4.2 The Decomposition
We now prove that the state Ψ ∈ HA ⊗HB can be de-
composed into the direct sum of EPR pairs. We begin with a
decomposition of P+1 Ψ, which is equal to R
+
1 Ψ by Lemma
1.
Lemma 6 One can write
P+1 Ψ =
∑
i∈I
αiai(0)⊗ bi(0)
where I is an index set, αi are complex numbers, and
ai(0) ∈ HA(i ∈ I), bi(0) ∈ HB(i ∈ I) are two respec-
tively orthonormal sets of eigenvectors of the operators P+1
(acting on HA) and R+1 (acting on HB).
Proof The lemma is proved with the help of Schmidt de-
composition theorem [30] [31]. We omit the details here.
2
Let β = (2 sin θcosθ)−1. Define ai(1) = β(P+3 −
P+2 )ai(0), and bi(1) = β(R
+
3 − R+2 )bi(0) for i ∈ I . Let
Ki ⊆ HA be the subspace spanned by ai(0) and ai(1); Let
Hi ⊆ HB be the subspace spanned by bi(0) and bi(1). The
plan is to show that
Ψ =
∑
i∈I
αi(ai(0)⊗ bi(0) + ai(1)⊗ bi(1)),
and that Ki, Hi have all the properties required to satisfy
the Main Theorem.
In the remainder of this subsection, we use Lemmas 2-5
to show that each Hi (Ki) behaves correctly under the pro-
jection operators Rxγ (P xγ ). In the next subsection, we com-
plete the proof by showing that all Hi (Ki) are orthogonal
to each other.
By Lemma 2, (u1, u2, · · · , u5) is isomorphic to√
2(P+1 Ψ, P
+
1 R
+
3 Ψ, P
+
1 R
−
3 Ψ, P
+
1 R
+
2 Ψ, P
+
1 R
−
2 Ψ). In
particular, this implies that any linear relation
∑
j λjuj = 0
must also be satisfied if uj are replaced by the appropriate
projected states. Now
P+1 Ψ =
∑
i∈I
αiai(0)⊗ bi(0),
P+1 R
+
3 Ψ =
∑
i∈I
αiai(0)⊗R+3 bi(0),
P+1 R
−
3 Ψ =
∑
i∈I
αiai(0)⊗R−3 bi(0),
P+1 R
+
2 Ψ =
∑
i∈I
αiai(0)⊗R+2 bi(0),
P+1 R
−
2 Ψ =
∑
i∈I
αiai(0)⊗R−2 bi(0).
This means that, for each i ∈ I , any linear relation∑
j λjuj = 0 must also be satisfied if we make the fol-
lowing substitutions:
u1 ← bi(0),
u2 ← R+3 bi(0),
u3 ← R−3 bi(0),
u4 ← R+2 bi(0),
u5 ← R−2 bi(0).
Lemma 7 For each i ∈ I , (u1, u2, · · · , u5) is isomorphic to
(bi(0), R
+
3 bi(0), R
−
3 bi(0), R
+
2 bi(0), R
−
2 bi(0)).
Proof Use the preceding observation and the orthogonality
between R+3 bi(0) and R−3 bi(0), and the orthogonality be-
tween R+2 bi(0) and R
−
2 bi(0)). We omit the details here. 2
Note that bi(1) = β(R+3 − R+2 )bi(0) by definition.
¿From Lemma 7, it is easy to see that bi(1) is a unit vec-
tor perpendicular to bi(0). In fact, bi(1) is mapped to the
vector (0, 1) under the isomorphism in Lemma 7.
¿From Lemma 7, for the purpose of vectors in the
space Hi, the projection operators R+3 , R−3 correspond to
choosing the coordinate system obtained from the system
(bi(0), bi(1)) rotated by the angle θ; similarly, R+2 , R−2 cor-
respond to choosing a coordinate system obtained from the
system (bi(0), bi(1)) rotated by the angle −θ. It remains
to show that R+1 , R
−
1 correspond to the coordinate system
(bi(0), bi(1)) itself. By definition R+1 bi(0) = bi(0). It re-
mains to prove that R−1 bi(1) = bi(1).
To do that, we use Lemma 3. Observe that
h = P+1 R
−
3 Ψ− P+1 R−2 Ψ
=
∑
i∈I
αiai(0)⊗R+3 bi(0)
−
∑
i∈I
αiai(0)⊗R+2 bi(0)
=
∑
i∈I
αiai(0)⊗ (R+3 −R+2 )bi(0)
= β−1
∑
i∈I
αiai(0)⊗ bi(1).
Since R−1 h = h by Lemma 3, we must have R
−
1 bi(1) =
bi(1). This completes the proof that the projection operators
Rxγ behave as required on the subspace Hi.
As stated explicitly in Lemma 5, we can obtain the sym-
metric statement that the the projection operatorsP xγ behave
as required on the subspace Ki.
Now that we have determined the behavior of the projec-
tion operators on Ki, Hi, we can in principle calculate any
polynomial of the projection operators on the state P+1 Ψ.
By Lemma 4, P−1 Ψ can be written as
P−1 Ψ = 2β
2(R+2 −R+3 )(P+2 − cos2 θ)P+1 Ψ.
This gives
P−1 Ψ = 2β
2
∑
i∈I
αi(P
+
2 −cos2 θ)ai(0)⊗ (R+2 −R+3 )bi(0).
After applying the rules and symplifying, we obtain
P−1 Ψ =
∑
i∈I
αiai(1)⊗ bi(1).
As Ψ = P+1 Ψ+ P
−
1 Ψ, this proves
Ψ =
∑
i∈I
αi(ai(0)⊗ bi(0) + ai(1)⊗ bi(1)).
4.3 Completing the Proof
It remains to show that all Hi are orthogonal to each
other. (A symmetric argument then shows that all Ki are
also orthogonal to each other.)
Let i 6= j ∈ I . Assume that Hi is not orthogonal to
Hj . We derive a contradiction. By definition,Hi is spanned
by bi(0), bi(1), and Hj is spanned by bj(0), bj(1). Clearly,
bi(1) and bj(1) are not orthogonal to each other, as all the
other pairs (bi(x), bj(y)) are orthogonal.
Choose a coordinate system for the space spanned by the
four vectors such that
bi(0) = (1, 0, 0, 0),
bi(1) = (0, 1, 0, 0),
bj(0) = (0, 0, 1, 0),
bj(1) = (0, s, 0, t),
where s 6= 0. From our knowledge about the behavior
of R3, we infer that R+3 bj(0) = (cos θ)w where w =
cos θbj(0) + sin θbj(1) = (0, s sin θ, cos θ, t sin θ). Sim-
ilary, R−3 bi(0) = (sin θ)w′ where w′ = − sin θbi(0) +
cos θbi(1) = (− sin θ, cos θ, 0, 0). As the inner product of
w andw′ is s sin θ cos θ which is non-zero, we conclude that
R+3 bj(0) and R−3 bi(0) are not orthogonal. This contradicts
the fact that R+3 , R
−
3 are projection operators to orthogonal
subspaces. This completes the proof.
5 Concluding Remarks
The security problem for imperfect source is a difficult
one to deal with. The present paper is a step in only one
possible direction. We have also limited ourselves to the
simplist case when the correlation probabilities pα,β(x, y)
are assumed to be measurable precisely. We leave open as
future research topics for extensions to more general mod-
els.
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